Hawks and Doves

Gary Hart:

If John McCain seriously believes we are at war with al Qaeda in Iraq, that alone is such a serious error in judgment as to rank him with George W. Bush at his worst and therefore disqualify him from any chance to govern this country.

Whenever I am feeling like I can’t take much more of teh stupid I head over to Juan Cole’s place. Today’s post made me feel warm all over. Political discourse in this country is so screwed up. It is no wonder that most Americans have little idea about the political actors and problems in Iraq when our specialists are restricted to writing on blogs while an endless cadre of American Enterprise Institute cretins, ideologues and propaganders have unrestricted and unchallenged access to the cable and network news.

I had an interesting conversation with a friend last night whose brother is a doctor in the military and has served one tour in Iraq. Over 4,000 soldiers have died in Iraq, and we were talking about those who are not killed, but rather injured, and how these casualties have been all but disappeared from the public discourse on costs. We also talked about how much battlefield medicine has improved. There are a lot of soldiers who are living who in earlier wars probably would have died from their wounds. I’m also chairing a Masters thesis of a student who is examining how the use of private military firms are decreasing the political costs of war. All this leads to an interesting question . . . does the decreasing costs of war associated with improved battlefield medicine and the use of private security forces make war more likely?

In a game theory class I took with Tom Schelling in graduate school, he made the comment that if war became so mechanized that it was simply robots fighting robots with humans controlling the action safely from afar, war would become much more likely. This was also the underlying moral theme of the first few books in Orson Scott Card’s Ender series. When Ender just thought he was playing a video simulation everything was fine and it was not until he learned that he was actually fighting a real battle that he was confronted with the moral consequences of killing.

Wow.

There is a lot of interesting things to think about in this Wired article on network warfare. First is the question of being able to fight a more “ethical” war using newer technologies that supposedly limit the number of civilian casualties is necessarily a good thing.

Network-centric wars would be more moral, too. Cebrowski later argued that network-enabled armies kill more of the right people quicker. With fewer civilian casualties, warfare would be more ethical. And as a result, the US could use military might to create free societies without being accused of imperialist arrogance.

This adds a new layer to some of the questions that are associated with understanding decisions to use force. If a decision-maker sees force as more “moral” because it is targeting “bad guys”, does that mean that war, in general, becomes more probable? And who determines who the bad guys are? Efficiency in killing does not lead to more moral decisions since one of the necessities of warfare is that an enemy be identified. Human experience indicates that it will be a long time before that list is a short list of the truly awful, instead of a long generic list of people who speak a similar language, share a common religion, or identify along similar ideological lines.

After six years in Afghanistan and over four years in Iraq, the article notes that many in the U.S. military have come to realize that their lack of cultural understanding and defaulting to armed responses has done nothing to help achieve U.S. objectives in the region. Recently they have deployed Human Terrain Teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Army has set aside $41 million to build what it calls Human Terrain Teams: 150 social scientists, software geeks, and experts on local culture, split up and embedded with 26 different military units in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next year. The first six HTTs are already on the ground. The idea, basically, is to give each commander a set of cultural counselors, the way he has soldiers giving him combat advice.

This raises a number of ethical issues for the discipline. Perhaps it is time to revisit the Student Pugwash pledge:

I promise to work for a better world, where science and technology are used in socially responsible ways. I will not use my education for any purpose intended to harm human beings or the environment. Throughout my career, I will consider the ethical implications of my work before I take action. While the demands placed upon me may be great, I sign this declaration because I recognize that individual responsibility is the first step on the path to peace.

I’ll be back to blogging regularly in a bit. The semester is underway but, alas, I am still finding myself perpetually behind.

Meanwhile, the Editors of the National Review recently wrote this about Iraq:

This war can still be won, but only if we have the nerve and the patience to see it through. Recent events on the ground, strategic interest, and morality all point to only one imperative: Stay.

I find it interesting that they cite morality as one of the reasons the United States should stay in Iraq. Undoubtedly their argument is that there exists the chance that many Iraqis may die if it devolves into even more of a sectarian civil war than what is currently occurring. However, I find it an odd argument for war supporters to make, since they surely had no moral qualms regarding the lives they were certainly willing to take to launch their little adventure in the first place. Wasn’t it just a few years back that they were telling us that moral relativism was a bad thing?

This is exactly right. Our Iraq policy has been to promote a civil war. We are training Iraqi forces to go after “bad guys.” Who are those bad guys? For the most party they are a disparate collection of Iraqi groups with political interests. Our training programs, however, have been based on the idea that the only way to legitimately deal with these groups is through elimination. Only small subsections of political elites are coming to the table and both sides are refusing any form of political compromise. This from McClatchy:

When President Bush announced plans to increase U.S. troop strength in Iraq to help calm Baghdad, U.S. officials had hoped that any decrease in violence would lead to greater willingness from Shiite and Sunni political leaders to reach an accommodation.

But that hasn’t happened. Sunnis have accused the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki of making no effort to stop Shiite militias from forcing Sunnis from their homes. Sunni ministers have withdrawn from the government in protest.

In the meantime, the most touted success of the campaign — an alliance between U.S. forces and some Sunni insurgent groups against al Qaida in Iraq — has angered many in the Maliki government, who accuse the United States of supporting groups that could ultimately turn against the government.

Former Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders will expect some kind of payoff for having turned on al Qaida, said Lt. Col. Richard Welch, who works primarily with Sunni tribal leaders and has negotiated with insurgents. Maliki’s government, however, has been hesitant to grant concessions, he said.

So, over four years into the occupation and six months into the escalation there is very little political progress being made in Iraq. Remember, that is the only measure of success. Violence in civil wars ebbs and flows; therefore, the only measure of success that ultimately counts is whether or not stable governing mechanisms are put into place. (The 18 benchmarks that the Iraqi government is supposed to be pursuing can be found here.)

According to Just Foreign Policy and based on an extrapolation of the Lancet study’s estimate from last October, over one million Iraqis have been killed in the Iraq War.

Tom Engelhardt of the Nation provides a list of some pretty sobering numbers:

Percentage of dollars annually appropriated by the U.S. government and spent on Iraq-related activities: More than 10%, or one dollar out of every 10, according to the CBO’s Sunshine.

Estimated monthly cost of the Iraq (and Afghan) Wars: $12 billion–$10 billion for Iraq–a third higher than in 2006, according to the non-partisan Congressional Research Service.

Estimated total cost of the Iraq War, if Robert Sunshine’s “optimistic scenario”–30,000 U.S. troops left in Iraq by 2010–plays out: Over $1 trillion. (If his less optimistic scenario proves accurate–75,000 troops in 2010–closer to $1.5 trillion.)

Number of Iraqis estimated to have fled their country: Between 2 million and 2.5 million. An estimated 750,000 to Jordan; 1.5 million to Syria; 200,000 to Egypt and Lebanon–with another 40,000-50,000 fleeing each month, 2,000 a day, according to UN figures. Officials at the central travel office in Baghdad are deluged by up to 3,000 passport applications a week. In addition, though it’s anyone’s guess, more than two million Iraqis may now be internal refugees, uprooted from their homes largely by sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. Approximately 70% of these are women and children, according to UNICEF.

…

Estimated number of bullets fired by U.S. troops for every insurgent killed in Iraq (or Afghanistan): 250,000, according to John Pike, director of the Washington military-research group GlobalSecurity.org. This comes out to 1.8 billion rounds of small-arms ammunition yearly. With U.S. munitions factories unable to meet the demand, 313 million rounds of such munitions were purchased from Israel last year for $10 million more than if produced domestically.

Percentage of amputations performed on U.S. war-wounded in Iraq: An estimated 6%. The average in earlier U.S. conflicts, where the equivalents of IEDs and car bombings did not play such a role, was 3%.

Estimated replacement limbs needed yearly for Iraqis in northern Iraq alone: 3,000, according to the Red Crescent Society and the director general for health services in Mosul. (Unlike American soldiers, Iraqis who have lost limbs have access only to limited numbers of outdated prostheses.)

Cost of a coffin in Baghdad: $50-75. Cost of a coffin in Saddam Hussein’s time, $5-10.

Number of Iraqi civilians who died in July 2007: 1,652, according to figures compiled by the Iraqi Health, Defense, and Interior Ministries; 2,024, according to the tally of the Associated Press; 1,539 according to the Washington Post. All but the Post claim this as a “spike” in casualties. All such figures are, for a variety of reasons, surely significant undercounts.

Approximate number of American civilians who would have died in July if a similar level of killings were underway in the United States: 18,000, according to Middle East scholar Juan Cole.

Estimated number of Iraqi deaths from the invasion of 2003 through June 2007, if the Lancet study’s median figure of 655,000 deaths was accurate and similar death rates held true for the year since it was published: Just over one million, according to Just Foreign Policy. (The Lancet study has been the single, on-the-ground, scientific report on Iraqi casualties in these years.)

…

Number of unidentified bodies, assumedly murdered by death squads, found on the streets of Baghdad in June 2007: 453, a rise of 41% over January 2007, the month before surge operations began, according to unofficial Iraqi Health Ministry statistics taken from morgue counts.

…

Number of American military deaths in the surge months, February-July 2007: 572, according to the Iraq Coalition Casualties website. This represents 189 more American deaths than in the same set of months in 2004, 215 more than in 2005, 237 more than in 2006.

Average daytime summer temperature in Baghdad: 110-120 degrees, though 130 degrees is not uncommon. It rarely drops below 100 degrees even at night.

Number of megawatts of electricity produced daily in Iraq: Less than 4,000 megawatts, below pre-invasion levels in a country where daily demand is now in the 8,500 to 9,500 range.

Hours of electricity normally delivered to Baghdadis by the national electricity grid: 1-2 hours a day. The only recourse, according to French reporter Anne Nivat, who lived in “red zone” Baghdad for two weeks recently, is electricity produced by small local generators, which consume up to 20 gallons of gasoline a day.

Number of nationwide blackouts in just two days in July 2007: 4. The Shiite Holy city of Karbala was without any power for at least 3 consecutive days in July, during which its water mains “went dry.” (”‘We no longer need television documentaries about the Stone Age. We are actually living in it. We are in constant danger because of the filthy water and rotten food we are having,’ said Hazim Obeid, who sells clothing at a stall in the Karbala market.”)

Cost of a bottle of purified water during the present water shortages: $1.60 for a 10-liter bottle, a rise of 33%. (Many Iraqis can’t afford to buy bottled water in a country where, according to a recent Oxfam summary study of the Iraqi humanitarian crisis, 43% of Iraqis live in “absolute poverty,” earning less than a dollar a day.)

Percentage of water engineers who have left Iraq: 40%, according to Oxfam’s report. Similar percentages of middle-class professionals–doctors, teachers, lawyers–have evidently fled as well. According to Oxfam, some universities and hospitals in Baghdad have lost up to 80% of their staffs.

Number of Iraqis who have access to clean drinking water: 1 in 3, according to UN figures. (In 2007, waterborne diseases, including diarrhea, “the most prolific killer of children under 5,” are up in some areas by 70% over the previous year.)

Of the 3.5 million cubic meters of water Baghdad’s six million people are estimated to need, amount actually delivered: 2.1 million cubic meters. Number of high-tension lines running into Baghdad that are in operation: 2 of 17, thanks to insurgent sabotage, according to an Electricity Ministry spokesman. These are contributing to the worst electricity shortages since the invasion summer of 2003. The country’s power grid is reportedly nearing collapse.

…

Amount of money missing due to governmental corruption, as uncovered in investigations by Iraq’s top anti-corruption investigator, Judge Rahdi al Rahdi: $11 billion.

Number of U.S. dollars invested in “standing up” (training) the Iraqi military and police: $19.2 billion. This works out to $55,000 per Iraqi recruit, according to a bipartisan U.S. Congressional investigation.

Amount the Pentagon has requested for continued training and equipping of Iraqi security forces: $2 billion.

Percentage of equipment the Pentagon has issued to Iraqi security forces since 2003 that cannot be accounted for: 30%. That includes at least “110,000 AK-47 rifles, 80,000 pistols, 135,000 items of body armor and 115,000 helmets,” according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). According to the Washington Post, “One senior Pentagon official acknowledged that some of the weapons probably are being used against U.S. forces.”

Number of U.S. steel-shipping containers in Iraq and Afghanistan now considered “lost”: 54,390 or one-third of them, according to the GAO.

Estimated cost of training Iraqi (and Afghan) security forces over the next decade, if present course continues: At least 50 billion dollars, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

It is generally the case that when the Bush Administration accuses someone of doing something, it generally means they are up to their necks in the same thing. So when the Bush Administration told Michael Gordan to write an article about how Iran is supplying arms to Iraqi insurgents, it probably had nothing to do with this GAO report released on July 31. From the abstract:

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items.

So, we are one of the main suppliers of weapons to the Iraqi insurgency. What is amazing is that this program, which is a security assistance program, was set up as separate from the security assistance programs the Department of Defense already had in place! While small arms accountability in the past has not perfect by any stretch of the imagine (see here, here, here, and here) the DOD has established accountability procedures, which appear to have been ignored. It seems like they wanted to do everything from scratch in Iraq.

History is going to show that the millions of dollars we poured into “training” Iraqis was mostly just providing intelligence and equipment to the Iraqi insurgency and that our forces were, from the beginning, completely infiltrated by double agents–none of which were loyal to U.S. goals or the occupation.

Juan Cole also has some interesting points to make about various accusations of who is supplying weapons to the insurgency.